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Anthony T. Kronmant
Our legal system, like every other, limits the power of individuals to
enlist the state in the enforcement of their private agree.ments.1 In a broad
sense, all limitations of this sort restrict the contractual freedom of those
involved by depriving them of the right to decide whether their voluntary
arrangements shall be legally binding. Many of these limitations are in-
tended to protect the interests of third parties, including the general inter-
ests of society at large: Two neighbors cannot make an enforceable con-
tract to rob a third, nor can a group of businessmen negotiate a price-
fixing agreement that will be binding as a matter of law. Other restraints
on contractual freedom, however, are primarily intended to protect those
whose freedom they restrict. Restraints of this sort aim to protect people
from themselves by limiting their capacity to make enforceable agreements
of various kinds.
In general, any legal rule that prohibits an action on the ground that it
would be contrary to the actor's own welfare is paternalistic. The prohibi-
tion against suicide,2 the requirement that motorcyclists wear helmets,
3
laws that restrict the use of drugs4 or make education compulsory5 are all
t Professor of Law, Yale University. An earlier version of this Article was presented at a meeting
of the Society for Ethical and Legal Philosophy; I am indebted to those who were present for their
comments and criticisms. Bruce Ackerman, Jerry Mashaw, Rob Prichard, and the Honorable Ellen
Peters also made helpful suggestions. Peter Swire provided valuable research assistance.
1. See 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOcIETY 668-71 (1968) ("[I]n no legal order is freedom of
contract unlimited in the sense that the law would place its guaranty of coercion at the disposal of all
and every agreement regardless of its terms.").
2. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScOrr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 568-71 (1972).
3. See Note, 7he Limits of State Intervention: Personal Identity and Ultra-Risky Actions, 85
YALE L.J. 826, 830-34 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Abromovsky & McCarthy, Civil Commitment of Non-Criminal Narcotic Addicts:
Parens Patriae; A Valid Exercise of a State's Police Power; or an Unconscionable Disregard of Indi-
vidual Liberty?, 38 PITT. L. REV. 477 (1977); Kaplan, The Role of the Law in Drug Control, 1971
DUKE L.J. 1065.
5. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48,200-48,320 (West 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-184 (1983).
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examples of legal paternalism. In this Article, I shall be concerned with
one branch of this wide and heterogeneous family of legal rules-those
that may properly be regarded as belonging to the law of contracts be-
cause the liberty they restrict is the liberty to bind oneself by making a
legally enforceable promise.
One (relatively new) example of the kind of restriction I have in mind
is the rule invalidating any provision in a residential lease that purports to
waive the tenant's right to withhold rent if the property fails to meet cer-
tain minimum standards of habitability.6 Even if a tenant believes that a
waiver of this sort would be in his own interest and voluntarily agrees to
include it in the lease, the law protects him by refusing to enforce his
waiver. The invalidity of contracts of peonage or self-enslavement,
7 of
agreements purporting to waive the promisor's right to obtain a divorce8
or sue for relief under the bankruptcy laws,' of provisions conferring on
either party a right to specifically enforce their agreement (where no right
of this sort exists as a matter of law); 0 the voidability of most contracts
made by infants;"1 and the nonwaiveable "cooling-off" period imposed by
law in many consumer transactions1" all also have, at least in part, a pa-
ternalistic objective. Unquestionably, some of these limitations on the en-
forceability of private agreements also seek to protect the moral and eco-
nomic interests of third parties and, to this extent, have a nonpaternalistic
objective as well. One central purpose of each, however, is to protect the
promisor himself by limiting his power to do what the law judges to be
against his own interests; this is paternalism, and there is more of it in
our law of contracts than one might suspect.
All paternalistic restrictions on conduct, including those contained in
the law of contracts, raise special problems from a moral point of view. It
is possible, of course, to deny that any such restrictions exist (by maintain-
ing that every apparent example of paternalism is in reality a disguised
prohibition against conduct that violates the rights of other persons).13 But
6. See infra p. 766.
7. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1588 (1982); see also Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 7-13 (1944)
(detailing history of Peonage Statutes); Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707, 708 (E.D. Ark. 1905) (peonage
"is the holding of any person to service of labor for the purpose of paying or liquidating an indebted-
ness due from the laborer or employee to the employer, when such employee desires to leave or quit
the employment before the debt is paid off").
8. See 15 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1741-1743 (3d ed. 1972).
9. See Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., dissenting); Federal Nat'l
Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157, 148 N.E. 379 (1925).
10. See Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 369-76 (1978).
11. See 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, §§ 222-248.
12. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 3-501 to 3-505 (1974); 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1983); see
Sher, The "Cooling-Ofi" Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 717 (1968); Note, A
Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cool-
ing-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969).
13. See Regan, Justifications for Paternalism, 15 NOMOS 189, 201-06 (1974).
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by acknowledging that it is ever morally permissible to prevent a person
from acting solely because he himself will be harmed by the action, one
embraces paternalism (in however limited a form) and has an obligation
to explain why such interference is permissible in some instances but not
in others. Everyone who has written on the subject of paternalism has
wrestled with this problem.14 Mill, for example, considered the prohibi-
tion against self-enslavement paternalistic, but made a considerable effort
to demonstrate its moral legitimacy.15 One who believes, as Mill did and I
do, that some paternalistic restrictions on contractual freedom are not only
permissible but morally required, must supply a standard or principle for
evaluating paternalistic arguments in particular cases; only in this way
can the legitimacy of paternalism be established and its limits defined.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that there is a single princi-
ple that best explains every paternalistic restriction in our law of con-
tracts. There is considerable diversity among these restrictions, and while
it is true that all of them seek to protect the promisor against the damag-
ing consequences of his own agreements, they do so in different ways and
for different reasons. Some paternalistic limitations on contractual free-
dom are best explained by considerations of economic efficiency and dis-
tributive fairness, others by the idea of personal integrity, and a third set
of limitations by the familiar, though poorly understood, notion of sound
judgment. None of these explanations is exclusive, and there is considera-
ble overlap among them, but each provides the most plausible justification
for one particular group or class of paternalistic restrictions in our law of
contracts. Although these three classes are connected in important ways,
the differences among them are real and worth emphasizing.
The principle (or principles) on which each class of restrictions rests
establishes a different framework of analysis and criticism, and in this
Article I shall attempt to clarify the basic differences among them. More
is involved here, however, than the presentation of a classificatory scheme.
The variety of paternalistic restrictions in our law of contracts reveals a
complexity in its intellectual premises that, though rarely acknowledged,
is one of the law's most distinctive features. I hope to bring this signifi-
cant, but forgotten, complexity more clearly into view.
14. See, e.g., J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 95 (D. Spitz ed. 1975); Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY
AND THE LAW 107 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971); Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105
(1971); Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Ref-
erence to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982); Luban,
Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454.
15. J. MILL, supra note 14, at 95.
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I. Economic Efficiency and Distributive Justice
In many jurisdictions, a nondisclaimable warranty of habitability is
now implied, as a matter of law, in every lease of residential property.' 6
Because the warranty is nondisclaimable, any agreement a tenant makes
to waive its benefits will be unenforceable. It is sometimes said that if
tenants were given the power to waive the warranty of habitability they
might be tricked or forced into doing so-to their own disadvantage-and
that the warranty has been made nondisclaimable in order to protect te-
nants from themselves.
17
To the extent the rule barring free waiver of the warranty of habitabil-
ity is acknowledged to have a paternalistic aim, its justification is a mixed
one, turning in part on considerations of efficiency and in part on a con-
ception of distributive justice. The first of these two arguments-the argu-
ment from economic efficiency-rests on the view that the prohibition
against waiver of the implied warranty of habitability is, in effect, an effi-
ciency-enhancing adjunct to the fraud remedy a disappointed tenant
would have were the warranty freely disclaimable. Making an entitlement
inalienable is a draconian, but sometimes efficient, way to protect its pos-
sessor against fraud or deception, and the decision to make the warranty
of habitability nondisclaimable can be defended on precisely these
grounds. At first glance, this view may seem implausible since considera-
tions of efficiency are typically invoked to attack, rather than defend,
nondisclaimable warranties. 18 It will be helpful, therefore, to begin by re-
calling why nondisclaimability is generally thought to be economically
objectionable.
In many transactions, various standard terms are implied as a matter of
law. These legally-implied provisions establish a set of ready-made con-
tract terms, and whenever the parties would have included similar provi-
sions in their agreement, they are made better off by being spared the
time and expense of having to do so.' 9 If in most transactions of a particu-
lar sort the parties prefer the standard terms the law provides, the reduc-
tion in their transaction costs is likely to exceed the increased costs in-
curred by the few who would prefer other implied terms and must
contract out of the regime to which they will otherwise be legally subject.
16. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080, 1082 n.58 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Fair v. Neglcy, 257 Pa. Super. 50, 55, 390 A.2d 240, 242 (1978);
Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF.
L. REV. 1444 (1974).
17. Fair v. Negley, 257 Pa. Super. 50, 56, 390 A.2d 240, 243 (1978); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash.
2d 22, 28, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973).
18. See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 253-61 (1979).
19. See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1981), and
sources cited therein.
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The legal implication of standard terms is therefore perfectly consistent
with the goal of promoting efficiency by reducing transaction costs. What
appears indefensible from an economic point of view is the decision to
make a standard term (like the warranty of habitability) nondisclaimable,
for this can make a difference only where the parties would agree to
waive the warranty if they could, and in every case of this sort, the prohi-
bition against waiver seems to reduce the parties' welfare. Such a prohibi-
tion might therefore be thought justifiable only on noneconomic grounds.
The inefficiency of nondisclaimable warranties, however, is not as obvi-
ous as this overly simple argument suggests. If we regard the warranty of
habitability as a device for allocating the risk that an undetected condition
will render the premises uninhabitable, it is indeed difficult to understand
why, from a strictly economic point of view, the warranty should be made
nondisclaimable. The warranty is a form of insurance and the tenant's
decision to solicit or refuse its inclusion in the lease will depend, in theory
at least, on which of the parties is able, at least expense, to insure against
or take steps to prevent the feared event.2" This assumes, however, that
when he signs the contract, the landlord does not know of any latent con-
dition that will make the property uninhabitable. If he knows that such a
condition exists, but denies that it does or falls to disclose it, the tenant's
agreement to waive the warranty of habitability can hardly be character-
ized as an efficient allocation of risk based upon his preference for self-
insurance. If the landlord has lied to the tenant, there is no economic
justification for enforcing their bargain; doing so would only give others
an incentive to spend more on fraud protection (a deadweight loss from
society's point of view).21 It is no answer to say that the tenant "takes the
risk" of his landlord's fraud when he agrees to waive the warranty, for
this would be like saying that I take the risk of being forced to sign a
contract at gunpoint when I go out unarmed and should therefore be held
to any promises extorted in this way. No economist would say that it is
efficient to enforce an agreement of the latter sort, and the reasons for
refusing to do so are just as strong when the agreement has been procured
through deliberate misrepresentation. Even if the landlord has done noth-
ing more than fail to disclose his knowledge of the latent condition, there
is no economic justification for enforcing the lease, unless his knowledge is
the fruit of a deliberate and socially productive search (which seems to me
unlikely for reasons I have elaborated elsewhere).2
20. See Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic
Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90 (1977).
21. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 81 (2d ed. 1977).
22. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
9-18 (1978). If this knowledge is the fruit of a productive search, however, it should be rewarded. Id.
at 13-14.
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Of course, when the law implies a warranty, but permits the parties to
vary or waive it at their discretion, a disappointed promisor has the right
to rescind the contract and recover damages if his agreement was induced
by misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment."3 A disclaimable war-
ranty, therefore, is always accompanied by a general remedy that protects
the intended beneficiary of the warranty in the event he agrees to waive it
after having been defrauded by the other party. The protection this gen-
eral remedy affords may be inadequate, however, since claims of fraud are
often difficult to prove.2 4 To establish such a claim, the victim must show
that he was intentionally deceived,25 and proof of the wrongdoer's mental
state can be difficult. In theory, a tenant will take these proof problems
into account in deciding whether to insist on a warranty of habitability
from his landlord, but those who are unfamiliar with the legal system and
do not have the benefit of professional counsel may underestimate the
magnitude of these problems or be largely unaware of their existence.
When a fraud has been committed, but cannot be proven, the agree-
ment will be enforced. This is an inefficient result. Of course, if this hap-
pens only rarely-if fraud can be established in almost every case in
which it occurs-the inefficiency of enforcing a few fraudulent bargains
may be justified by some other, more desirable, consequence of a strict
proof system (for example, its tendency to discourage vexatious lawsuits
brought only to harass or blackmail the defendant). But if a large number
of fraudulent bargains are enforced, the efficiencies of a strict proof system
may be outweighed by its inefficiencies. One way of remedying this situa-
tion, of course, is to lower the proof requirements. But if fraud is wide-
spread, if it can be concealed with sufficient ease, and if the victims of
fraud typically lack the resources to prosecute their legal claims, lowering
the proof requirement may not be enough. A more radical solution-but
one that is nevertheless justifiable from an economic point of view, at least
under certain conditions-is to give the victims an inalienable entitlement
they cannot waive and therefore cannot be fraudulently induced to aban-
don. This solution has the obvious defect of preventing the parties from
modifying the entitlement, even when it would be efficient for them to do
so and neither has practiced fraud upon the other. But if the entitlement
can be waived, if most of the waivers that are given are procured through
fraud, and if the fraud can rarely be proven, the inefficiencies of a no-
waiver rule may be outweighed by the greater inefficiency of enforcing too
many fraudulent bargains.
23. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 607 (1 vol. ed. 1952).
24. Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67,
68 (1973).
25. 12 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 1487, at 326-27.
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The argument I have just sketched is not a defense of the implied war-
ranty of habitability in particular, but only an outline of the general form
such a defense might take. For the argument to have merit in this particu-
lar case, there must be some basis for believing that fraudulent deception
is more likely and less easily provable here than in general. One factor
that may make the danger of unprovable fraud especially great in certain
situations, including this one, is the existence of a significant asymmetry
in the parties' access to relevant information. Whether there is a latent
condition that will render the premises uninhabitable often cannot be de-
termined by a brief inspection, even if it is conducted with care; typically,
conditions of this sort come to light only after a period of occupancy. In
this respect, nonhabitability resembles other defects that appear only with
use.26 Even if a landlord does not himself occupy the premises he is rent-
ing, he is likely to have the benefit of whatever information previous te-
nants have acquired and there are a variety of ways he can prevent them
from disclosing this information to prospective renters, who may find it
difficult to acquire such information- on their own.27 In addition, the land-
lord's superior knowledge and continuing access to the property increase
his ability to conceal latent defects in ways that are not obvious and,
therefore, not easily demonstrable in a subsequent lawsuit. For these rea-
sons, it is arguable that the landlord's informational advantage increases
the likelihood of unprovable fraud in just those cases in which he has
persuaded his tenant to relinquish the protection afforded by a warranty
of habitability; if so, it may be economically efficient to make the warranty
nondisclaimable 8
26. The automobile that turns out to be a "lemon" is a familiar example. If "lemon" means "has
a chronic tendency to function inadequately," then this is a defect whose detection, by definition,
requires a period of use and observation. See Akerloff, The Market for "Lemons': Quality Uncer-
tainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
27. The efficiency justification for nondisclaimable warranties is less compelling in the case of
renewal leases, since here tenants will have easier access to information concerning latent defects. Few
would argue, however, that an exception to the nondiscaimability rule should be carved out to cover
renewal leases. This suggests that nondisclaimable warranties have some other justification as well.
See infra pp. 770-74 (discussing distributive justice effects).
28. Not all consumer contracts involve informational asymmetries of this sort. In the case of newly
manufactured goods, for example, defects that occur during the manufacturing process may not be
discoverable by either the buyer or the seller. The seller can, of course, take precautionary measures
to avoid such defects, and if it is more efficient for him to do so than for the buyer to self-insure, the
parties will (in theory) agree on a warranty term that shifts the risk of the defect to the seller. Priest,
A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1307-13 (1981). Because the
existence of a latent defect will in most cases be revealed only with use, the seller of new goods is less
able to defraud his purchasers (fraud, by definition, requires knowledge of the defect, and not merely
a probabilistic estimate of its existence). The economic justification for implying nondisclaimable war-
ranties in the sale of new goods is therefore not compelling, and statutes having this effect, like the
nonuniform amendment to U.O.C. § 2-316 that several states have enacted, see MD. COM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 2-316 (Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-
107 (1980), are vulnerable to criticism from an economic point of view. The Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty, Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(12) (1982), places similar
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Since the same information that reveals the existence of a latent defect
often suggests a method for concealing it, informational asymmetries not
only increase the likelihood of fraud but also make such fraud more diffi-
cult to prove. The case for implying a nondisclaimable warranty is there-
fore stronger when such asymmetries exist. But this is only one factor
bearing upon the frequency and legal proof of fraudulent deception. The
relative wealth and sophistication of the parties is another. The more a
person is willing to spend on concealment, the harder he can make it to
establish that the concealment was fraudulent; the most subtle deceptions
are often distinguished by their seeming innocence.
Undoubtedly, other factors bear on the question of fraud, and their
complete description would represent an important step toward an eco-
nomic theory of fraud, a subject curiously neglected in the law and eco-
nomics literature." The formulation of a comprehensive theory of this
sort is a task beyond the scope of this Article; until we have such a theory,
however, any conclusion regarding the efficiency or inefficiency of nondis-
claimable warranties must remain tentative.
A second and quite different justification for refusing to permit the vol-
untary waiver of certain warranties, such as the warranty of habitability,
follows from the idea that in some circumstances a prohibition of this sort
may be an essential part of a program of distributive justice. Many, in-
cluding myself, have defended the view that private law norms may legiti-
mately be used to redistribute wealth when alternative methods of doing
so are likely to be more costly or intrusive.30 The distributive justification
for making certain contractual entitlements inalienable by prohibiting
their waiver is' simply an extension of this idea and is implicit in the fa-
miliar and widely accepted notion of an adhesive contract. 1
Where there is a striking imbalance in the bargaining power of the
parties to a contract, so that one is able to dictate terms to the other-to
insist that the exchange be on his terms or not at all-the contract is said
to be one of adhesion. Consumer contracts are often characterized as adhe-
restrictions on the ability of sellers of consumer goods to disclaim implied warranties.
29. One notable exception is Darby & Karni, supra note 24.
30. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685,
1778 (1976) (contract law as "ideal context" for judicially created altruistic order); Kronman, Con-
tract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980) (discussing method for achieving distrib-
utive goals through contract law); Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of
Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1016-37 (1978) (housing-code regulation of rental contracts justifiable
as redistributive measure even if not demonstrably "efficient" in economic sense).
31. The classic article is Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); see also K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-
71 (1960) (discussing meaningfulness of parties' consent to boiler-plate); Leff, Contract as Thing, 19
AM. U.L. REV. 131 (1970) (consumer contract of adhesion looks like but is not classic bargained
contract); Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REV.
1178 (1964) (advocating nonenforcement of clauses not consistent with a contract's core purpose).
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sive, since the consumer has little or no control over the terms of the
agreement.,n recent years, courts and legislatures have intervened in the
exchange process, with increasing frequency, to correct the imbalance of
bargaining power that contracts of this sort appear to involve. Typically,
the first step has been the judicial or statutory implication of warranty
terms that increase the consumer's rights under the contract, giving him
what he wants but has no power to demand.8" But so long as the party
with the greater bargaining power can force the other to waive whatever
liability these implied terms create, he can easily restore the original im-
balance the warranty is meant to correct. At this point, a court or legisla-
ture determined to achieve greater equality in bargaining power may be
tempted to make the implied warranty nondisclaimable.8 s
The attack on contracts of adhesion rests upon an unstated conception
of distributive fairness; though often overlooked, it is this conception that
gives, the attack its appeal. Many contracts are contracts of adhesion in the
general sense that one party is able to dictate terms to the other, but this
alone does not make an agreement objectionable. Suppose, for example,
that my neighbor owns a painting I happen to covet. I offer him $5000 for
it. He responds, "$10,000 and no warranties regarding its authenticity.
Take it or leave it." Clearly, the fact that I lack bargaining power and
must adhere to the terms he proposes does not by itself justify a judicial or
legislative effort to tip the balance in my favor. The imbalance in this
case, which stems from the fact that he owns the painting and I do not, is
unobjectionable because we do not care how control over the painting is
distributed."
We feel differently about the distribution of control over society's avail-
able housing stock, and inequalities of bargaining power in this context
therefore seem a more appropriate target for judicial or legislative attack.
The distribution of housing matters more to us than the distribution of
paintings: Only the first is likely to seem important from the standpoint of
most theories of distributive justice. Those contracts of adhesion that dis-
turb us do so, then, because they reflect an underlying distribution of
power or resources that offends our conception of distributive fairness;
when distributive concerns are weak or nonexistent, contracts of adhesion
32. See Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law (pt. 1), 74 YALE LJ.
262, 266-72 (1964).
33. Clark & Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A New Dimension in Consumer Protection,
23 U. KAN. L. REV. 567, 584-97 (1975).
34. If we did care about how control over paintings is distributed-and perhaps we should-we
might forbid private owners of artworks from selling to anyone but public institutions or even compel
them to transfer ownership for reasonable compensation. For a discussion of the relative advantages of
private and public ownership of artworks, see Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34
STAN. L. REV. 275, 299-301 (1982).
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are less troubling and the concept of adhesion itself loses meaning.
. It is therefore misleading to describe the nondisclaimable warranty of
habitability as simply a device for correcting an imbalance in bargaining
power. More accurately, it is an instrument of redistribution that seeks to
shift control over housing from one group (landlords) to another (tenants)
in a way that furthers the widely shared goal of insuring everyone shelter
of at least a minimally decent sort. To achieve this goal, the warranty
must be made nondisclaimable, for if it is not, tenants-poor tenants in
particular-will routinely be required to waive their rights to habitable
premises, thereby restoring whatever distributional inequities exist at the
outset.
This argument is subject to two familiar criticisms. First, even if a
nondisclaimable warranty of habitability does redistribute wealth or
power from landlords to tenants, it need not necessarily improve the over-
all position of the poor. If enough landlords are themselves poor, the war-
ranty may conceivably have the opposite effect, and it will in any event
also work to the benefit of those who can afford housing of better quali-
ty.3 5 Consequently, from the standpoint of a comprehensive program of
distributive justice, which seeks to achieve a fair distribution of wealth in
some overall sense, a limited measure of this sort may seem ineffective or
even perverse.
This first criticism is unpersuasive. In the United States, wealth and the
ownership of land are correlated to a sufficiently high degree that one may
be used as an imperfect, but convenient, proxy for the other; 6 a legal rule
that redistributes wealth from landlords to tenants is thus likely to result
in a more equal distribution of wealth overall. More importantly, partial
measures of this sort, which affect only certain groups in society, can play
a distinctive and needed function in a comprehensive program of distribu-
tive justice. Even if the total wealth of society were distributed more
evenly, it would still be necessary to insure that no group retained control
of any vitally important resource for which it could extract a monopoly
rent. To prevent the accumulation of monopoly power, redistributive
schemes must take into account not only how much people own, but what
they own as well. Partial measures that affect the distribution of only a
single good, like housing, are therefore likely to be a necessary component
of any redistributive program.
A second objection to using the nondisclaimable warranty of habitabil-
ity as an instrument of distributive justice has greater force. Even if land-
35. See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes,
Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1173-75 (1971).
36. J. LEWIS, LANDOWNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1978, at 10 (Agric. Information Bull.
No. 435, 1980).
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lords are barred from disclaiming responsibility for the habitability of
property they rent, as long as they are not similarly prevented from alter-
ing other aspects of their contractual relationship with their tenants, they
can easily pass along-in the form of an increased rent charge-whatever
additional insurance or compliance costs they incur as a result of their
expanded warranty liability." To the extent this is true, the tenant must
pay for the increased protection the warranty gives him-whether he
wants it or not. Landlords, one could argue, are likely to be unaffected by
a nondisclaimable warranty of habitability, since they will not bear its
cost; by contrast, tenants will have to purchase a form of compulsory in-
surance and can only be made worse off as a result.
There are two ways of meeting this criticism. The first is to deny the
unstated premise on which it rests-that the rule in question must be
evaluated from the standpoint of the tenants' own preferences. Even if the
costs of complying with the warranty are fully passed along, this only
means that some tenants will have to pay for protection they do not want,
and this is objectionable only in case the wishes of the tenants themselves
should be controlling. But there may be nothing wrong with forcing te-
nants, including poor tenants, to spend their money on better housing (or
more exactly, on insurance against the risk of inadequate housing). We
recognize the legitimacy of compulsory insurance in other areas; social
security is one example,3 8 and the inalienable right to a discharge in
bankruptcy is another.39 Whether we should also recognize it in the area
of housing will depend upon the relative importance we attach to this
good and our confidence that poor tenants will not discount too sharply
the value of housing insurance.
Second, even if we evaluate the warranty of habitability on the basis of
what tenants actually want, the pass-along argument sketched above is
less persuasive than its initial formulation suggests. The extent to which
landlords are able to pass along the increased costs of a nondisclamable
warranty of habitability will depend upon characteristics of the rental
market that are contingent and variable and cannot be determined in an a
priori fashion.4 ° Under certain empirically possible conditions, landlords
will be able to pass along only a small portion of these costs and will have
to absorb the rest;41 moreover, if alternative uses of the property are eco-
nomically unattractive, the added cost to landlords of a nondisclaimable
37. Ackerman, supra note 35, at 1183.
38. For an account of the longstanding public consensus regarding the social security system and
the growing controversy surrounding it, see M. DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
(1979).
39. See cases cited supra note 9; infra pp. 784-86.
40. See Ackerman, supra note 35, at 1183-85.
41. Id.
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warranty of habitability may cause the number of available rental units to
decline only slightly, if at all. When these conditions are satisfied, tenants
will receive the benefit of the warranty for less than its full cost and will
not be hurt through disinvestment in the rental market. In the limiting
case, tenants will get something for nothing, and, short of that, they may
get it for less than what they would be willing to pay. If so, they are
clearly better off, from their own point of view, under a legal regime that
makes the warranty of habitability nondisclaimable.
The pass-along argument used to support the claim that nonwaivable
warranties are inherently self-defeating is only one example of a more
general criticism applicable to all redistributive schemes that leave any
contractual freedom to those whose wealth is being redistributed. Whether
one elects to redistribute through the tax system or by modifying the rules
of private law that fix the terms on which individuals are permitted to
exchange their resources, private arrangements that shift the incidence of
the tax or pass along the cost of the regulatory rule may seriously compro-
mise redistributive objectives. This problem can be avoided only by impos-
ing even more dramatic restrictions on the contractual freedom of the indi-
viduals involved. If we are unwilling to do this, we have no choice but to
evaluate the problem from a comparative point of view and ask ourselves
whether it is likely to be more serious under one scheme than another.'2
The relevant question, therefore, is not whether the decision to use a
nondisclaimable warranty of habitability as an instrument of distributive
justice can be frustrated by the private contractual reallocation of its bur-
dens, but whether the general problem of pass-along is more serious here
than it would be, say, in a scheme that attempts to achieve the same goal
by taxing landlords to subsidize low-income tenants. Unless one abandons
the goal of providing minimally decent housing for everyone, this compar-
ative question cannot be avoided, and it is by no means obvious that it
must be decided against the implied warranty of habitability and in favor
of some other redistributive technique (especially when costs of adminis-
tration and enforcement are taken into account). Which technique we
adopt will depend, in large part, upon empirical characteristics of the
housing market; the choice, therefore, cannot be made on theoretical
grounds alone.
II. Personal Integrity
The nondisclaimable warranty of habitability seems best explained by
considerations of economic efficiency and distributive justice. There are,
however, many paternalistic restrictions in our law of contracts that can-
42. See Kronman, supra note 30, at 505-06.
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not be wholly, or most convincingly, explained on these same grounds.
One important example is the varied group of restrictions intended to pre-
vent an individual from contracting away too large a part of his personal
liberty. The most obvious and elementary restriction of this sort is the
prohibition against contracts of peonage or self-enslavement. Similar,
though less dramatic, restrictions include the bar against agreements pur-
porting to waive the promisor's right to engage in a particular profession,
obtain a discharge in bankruptcy, initiate a divorce action, or breach a
contract of employment and substitute money damages for the promised
performance. Each of these limitations restricts a person's contractual
powers by creating an inalienable entitlement of some sort, and in each
case the justification for the restriction is the same: A person who would
give away too much of his own liberty must be protected from himself, no
matter how rational his decision or compelling the circumstances.
To justify the prohibition against self-enslavement and its various corol-
laries on distributive grounds, the concept of distributive justice must be
expanded in ways many will think improper. These restrictions are not
meant to insure the fair distribution of some scarce material resource like
housing; to the extent they are concerned with distribution at all, it is with
the distribution of a personal right or liberty-the liberty to use one's own
self in whatever way seems best. It is possible, of course, to treat the dis-
tribution of this right in the same way one treats the distribution of rights
to nonhuman resources, by assuming that, within certain very broad lim-
its, a person's own talents and capacities represent assets belonging to a
common fund, the rights to which must be allocated in accordance with
the same principles of fairness that govern the distribution of material
goods.'3 Pushed to its limits, this view would empty the notion of personal
identity of all meaning and undermine the concept of independent individ-
uality on which all programs of distributive justice rest. But more impor-
tant for present purposes, even if we accept the idea that a right to dispose
of one's own self must be justified on the same distributive grounds as any
other entitlement, it is still unclear why this right should be limited by a
prohibition against self-enslavement. One can argue, as Mill does, 44 that
without such a prohibition the right to self-control may be destroyed
through its alienation and conclude that a bar against self-enslavement is
necessary to preserve the desired distributional pattern of personal liber-
ties. But this begs the question: Why does a person's inability to enslave
himself increase his self-control rather than diminish it? Any theory of
distributive justice that purports to explain the prohibition against self-
43. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 100-04 (1978); Kronman, Talent Pooling, 23 NOMOS 58
(1981).
44. J. MILL, supra note 14, at 95.
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enslavement assumes the answer to this question, an answer that cannot
be supplied by the theory itself.
It is even more difficult to explain the bar against self-enslavement and
other analogous legal restrictions in purely economic terms. Consider, for
example, the inability of debtors to contract away their statutory right to a
discharge in bankruptcy.45 In certain circumstances, it may be rational for
a debtor to waive his right to a discharge in return for a reduction in the
cost of credit. An agreement of this sort can effectively communicate infor-
mation both about the debtor's creditworthiness and the likelihood he will
need to invoke the bankruptcy laws.4 1 In some cases, it may also be more
efficient for the debtor to self-insure against the risk of insolvency than for
him to purchase insurance from his creditor (by retaining the right to
avoid the debt in bankruptcy). Barring the debtor from waiving his right
to a discharge forces him to employ a more expensive method for commu-
nicating such information or forego the exchange entirely (if the creditor
refuses to lend on any other terms). Both results seem inefficient and are
difficult to justify from an economic point of view.
The same is true of the rule barring antenuptial agreements that de-
prive one or both parties of the right to sue for divorce.47 By waiving the
right to bring a divorce action, an anxious suitor can convincingly convey
the depth of his or her commitment (something a checkered marital re-
cord, for example, might otherwise leave in doubt). Again, the power to
make an enforceable promise of this sort facilitates the communication of
information regarding the promisor's sincerity and future intentions; a
ban on such agreements makes this communication more difficult and may
even exclude some from the marriage market altogether.
The economic argument in favor of allowing parties to make agree-
ments of this kind is similar to the argument in favor of recognizing the
validity of so-called "penal" clauses in commercial contracts. In some
cases, it is claimed, a buyer or seller can persuade the other party of his
trustworthiness only by promising to pay a penalty in the event he falls to
perform.48 The prohibition against penal clauses has been vigorously at-
tacked in the law and economics literature,'49 and it is difficult to see why
the same argument does not also apply to the bar against antenuptial
45. See supra note 9.
46. For a discussion of the difficulties created by "information impactedness," see 0. WILLIAM.
SON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 31-37 (1975).
47. See supra note 8.
48. This may be true, for example, if little is known about the promisor or if his past record does
not inspire confidence.
49. See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 18, at 260-61; Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Dam-
ages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a
Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). For a defense of the prohibition, see Rea,
Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147 (1984).
Vol. 92: 763, 1983
Paternalism and Contracts
agreements depriving one or both parties of the right to terminate their.
relationship by divorce.
Even the basic prohibition against self-enslavement is suspect from a
purely economic point of view. If Spartacus agrees to become the slave of
Claudius in return for a guarantee of food, shelter, and education for his
children, there is no a priori basis for thinking the exchange inefficient.
The welfare of both parties may be increased by an arrangement that
gives one irrevocable control over the labor of the other (subject only to a
few broad restrictions designed to insure the slave's safety and physical
health) in return for certain contractually specified benefits. If the slave
lacks the managerial skills needed to exploit his own labor most produc-
tively, it is especially likely that an arrangement of this sort will be
efficient.50
There is, however, at least one plausible economic argument for the
prohibition against self-enslavement. Like the nondisclaimable warranty
of habitability, the bar against self-enslavement can be viewed as a sec-
ond-best device for preventing certain forms of deception and duress that
cannot be attacked more directly. If we assume that in most cases a person
would not contract into slavery unless he were illegitimately compelled to
do so, but that such compulsion is difficult to detect and cannot easily be
brought under existing rules regarding duress and unconscionability, a fiat
prohibition against such agreements may be the only administratively fea-
sible way of preventing illicit coercion.51 There is, however, something
unsatisfying about this argument: Even if we had an inexpensive mecha-
nism that enabled us to discriminate, with complete confidence, between
coerced contracts of enslavement and uncoerced ones, many, including my-
self, would still favor the prohibition of all such agreements. This suggests
that our intuitive opposition to self-enslavement rests upon considerations
that the argument just sketched does not capture or adequately express.
The effort to justify the prohibition against self-enslavement and its le-
gal corollaries is made more difficult by the fact that many enforceable
agreements have consequences similar to those the restrictions in question
forbid. For example, although an antenuptial agreement waiving either
party's right to sue for divorce is unenforceable as a matter of law, an
agreement that penalizes the party initiating a divorce action by depriving
him or her of any interest in the other's estate may be honored, depending
50. See Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudi-
cation, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 501 (1980); see also R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE
CROSS (1974) (discussing possible efficiencies of American slave system); Galenson, The Market Eval-
uation of Human Capital: The Case of Indentured Servitude, 89 J. POL. ECON. 446 (1981) (defend-
ing efficiency of indentured servitude). But see Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Prin-
ciple, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 241-42 (1980) (criticizing Posner's view).
51. A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 18, at 259; Feinberg, supra note 14, at 119-20.
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upon the circumstances and the exact terms of the agreement.52 Beyond a
certain point, of course, there is little difference between simply waiving
the right to sue for divorce and penalizing its exercise, and it is puzzling
that the law so clearly forbids one, but is increasingly tolerant of the
other. Similarly, although a loan contract waiving the debtor's right to a
discharge in bankruptcy is legally invalid, a secured transaction in which
the debtor uses exempt property as collateral is not.53 The purpose of a
bankruptcy discharge is to give the debtor a fresh start in his financial
affairs, but the exemption of certain property from the bankrupt's es-
tate-historically, a much, older feature of bankruptcy law than the
debtor's right to a discharge-has the same purpose. It is not at all clear
why a debtor should be able to compromise his fresh start by contracting
away his exemption privileges, but not his right to a discharge. Even the
prohibition against peonage or self-enslavement, as well entrenched as it
is, permits a variety of employment relationships that exhibit many of the
same characteristics." In short, the limits each of these "absolute"
prohibitions imposes on contractual freedom may be approached in vary-
ing degrees; the result is a gray zone of increasing restrictiveness, rather
than a bright line crisply demarcating the permissible from the impermis-
sible. Still, one wonders, why are there any restrictions at all?
The first step in answering this question is to clarify the meaning of
self-enslavement. Every executory contract limits the freedom of the par-
ties by creating an enforceable obligation, on both sides, to perform or pay
damages: Once an individual has made a contractually binding commit-
ment, his alternatives are limited to these two (assuming the other party is
not himself in breach). The distinguishing mark of a contract of self-
enslavement is that it purports to take away the latter alternative. From a
legal point of view, it is not the length of service that makes a contract of
employment self-enslaving, nor is it the nature of the services to be per-
52. In the past, such agreements were routinely invalidated on the grounds that they represented
"an invitation to promote discord and instability in marriage"; the current trend, however, "is for
courts to analyze the terms of these clauses on a case to case basis and uphold their validity if they are
fair and reasonable." Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App. 3d 83, 87, 320 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1974); see Buettner
v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719
(1973); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960).
53. There is one important exception: A debtor in bankruptcy may avoid a nonpossessory, non-
purchase-money security interest in household furnishings, wearing apparel, professional implements
and certain other items of personal property "[n]otwithstanding any waiver of exemptions." 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(0 (1982).
54. The domestic service contract is one example. See Havighurst, Services in the Home-A
Study of Contract Concepts in Domestic Relations, 41 YALE L.J. 386, 400-05 (1932) (where one
party has agreed to care for the other for life, even justified decision to leave may deprive the em-
ployee of any right to compensation for benefits conferred). A covenant not to compete with one's
employer during and after the period of employment is another example. 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS §§ 1379-1403 (1962) (discussing restraint of trade); 14 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, §§
1628-1664B (same).
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formed; even a contract of short duration that calls for the performance of
routine and unobjectionable tasks is a contract of self-enslavement and
therefore legally unenforceable if it bars the employee from substituting
money damages for his promised performance.55 The law will not permit
an employee to contract away his right to "depersonalize" a relationship
by paying damages in the event he chooses to breach. Whatever its other
terms, an employment contract is enslaving if it gives the employer a right
to compel specific performance of the agreement.
56
An antenuptial agreement waiving the right to sue for divorce can be
described as a contract of self-enslavement in just this sense. The parties
to a marital contract have considerable freedom to define in advance the
nature and extent of their financial responsibilities in the event of a di-
vorce or separation, but neither can give the other the power to compel
specific performance by waiving the right to terminate the relationship
through divorce.57 Here, as in the employment context, the right to substi-
tute damages for the actual performance of the contract is inalienable, and
any agreement purporting to forfeit this entitlement is invalid as a matter
of law.
Only the prohibition against waiving one's right to a discharge in bank-
ruptcy cannot be described in similar terms; since the performance called
for in this case is the satisfaction of a monetary obligation, the relationship
between the parties is depersonalized from the outset. However, with this
one exception (to which I shall return),58 the prohibition against self-
55. This precise characteristic has been held to be the distinctive mark of the peonage system and
other forms of involuntary servitude. See cases cited supra note 7. The peonage relationship-which
often has a contractual origin-was distinguished from other legitimate employment contracts on the
grounds that the peon not only agreed to work for his master for a fixed or indefinite period of time,
but also gave up his right to quit whenever he wished and avoid the contract by making a compensa-
tory payment of money damages.
56. This theme links the Peonage Cases, 136 F. 707, 708 (E.D. Ark. 1905), to the well-estab-
lished doctrine of contract law that an employee's obligations will not be specifically enforced, even if
the parties have provided that they shall be. 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 1423. The well-known
case of Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Oh. 1852), is not to the contrary. Although the injunc-
tion awarded in that case prohibited the defendant from singing in other theaters, it did not subject
her to the personal authority of the plaintiff; like money damages, the injunction in Lumley caused
the defendant only economic loss (albeit a substantial one).
An employee may specifically enforce an employment contract against a corporate employer. Stak-
linski v. Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959). This is consis-
tent with the view that the right to depersonalize a contractual relationship is inalienable, since a
corporation, though a legal person, lacks the elements of personal integrity this right protects. Note,
Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1652-55 (1982) (arguing that
rights of corporation flow only' derivatively from corporate personality).
In Canada, labor contracts are specifically enforceable against unions, which, like corporations, are
deemed to lack the elements of personal integrity necessary to support the right to depersonalize
contractual relationships. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Winnipeg Builders Exch., 65
D.L.R.2d 242 (1967).
57. See supra note 8.
58. See infra pp. 784-86.
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enslavement and its analogues all appear to have the same goal-to pre-
vent the promisor from contracting away the right to depersonalize his
relationship with the other party by substituting damages for the perform-
ance he originally promised.
The prohibition against such contracts is best explained, in my view, by
the special threat they pose to the promisor's integrity or self-respect. The
nature of this threat is revealed with particular clarity when the prom-
isor's own values have changed dramatically since he entered the contract.
To see why this is so, it is useful to draw a distinction between what I
shall call disappointment and regret.
Every contractual obligation is undertaken on the basis of certain as-
sumptions about the world (that the fall wheat harvest will be a poor one,
that Israel and Egypt will remain at peace, and so forth). If an assump-
tion proves to have been mistaken and one of the parties to the contract is
deprived of the benefit he expected, we say he is disappointed: Things
have not worked out as he wished. It does not follow, however, that a
disappointed promisor will regard his contract as an irrational venture;
given what he knew at the time he made the contract, it may have been
perfectly rational for him to accept the risks associated with it. A mistaken
assumption need not give the promisor grounds for questioning the ration-
ality of his initial decision.
Mistakes of this sort, however, are not the only reason a person may
subsequently wish he had refrained from making a particular contract. 59
When someone assumes a contractual obligation, he generally has certain
goals he believes will be promoted by the arrangement. If his goals
change, the contract may lose its original attractiveness and become point-
less (or even reprehensible) from the promisor's point of view, despite the
fact that all his assumptions about the world have proven accurate. Even
if the fall wheat crop is as bountiful as I predicted, making my futures
contract hugely profitable, I may wish that I had not made the agreement
if, in the meantime, I have experienced a religious conversion that causes
me to look on every worldly endeavor as a polluting distraction. When a
person wishes that he had not made a particular contract because his goals
have changed, he feels regret, rather than disappointment.
There is an important difference between regret and disappointment.
Disappointment does not by itself undermine a person's confidence in the
rationality of his own choices; regret can and often does. Whether it is
rational for a person to pursue a particular course of action depends upon
the goals he happens to have; these form the framework within which the
59. Charles Fried notes the existence of different types of mistakes, including mistakes regarding
the promisor's own future interests and desires, but fails to recognize the special moral significance of
mistakes of the latter sort. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 19-21 (1981).
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instrumental efficacy of his actions must be assessed. If a person is merely
disappointed by the way things turn out (he expected the wheat crop to be
significantly larger), but his goals remain unchanged, the framework
within which he retrospectively assesses the rationality of his contract will
be the same as the one within which he concluded it was rational to make
the contract in the first place. A person may of course wish that he had
not made a contract that has become burdensome as a result of events he
believed would not occur. But if there is continuity in the goals that shape
his practical deliberations, his disappointment will not lead him to doubt
the rationality of the original decision, given what he then knew; under
these circumstances, a person is likely to feel that he did the best he could;
at most, he may blame himself for having terminated his search for infor-
mation short of the point that was economically justifiable and ascribe
responsibility for his misfortune to the uncertainties that plague all
human conduct.
If, however, a person's goals have hanged significantly, his earlier deci-
sion may now appear irrational, for his original aims no longer provide
the framework for his deliberations. To assess the rationality of his own
actions within the context of his earlier (now abandoned) goals, a person
must not only forget what he has learned about the world in the
meantime; he must also suspend his present values and ask himself what
course of action would be rational for a person with the values he once
had. This is a much more difficult task, for it requires the imaginative
suspension of the evaluative framework that presently determines the ends
to which his knowledge of the world shall be put. Some people are able to
understand empathetically the system of goals that guided them at an ear-
lier point in their own lives-much as a sociologist or anthropologist is
able to empathize with the subjects of his inquiry, who often belong to a
very different culture-and to understand the meaningfulness of their ex-
perience from within. Even in the latter case, however, our powers of
empathy are limited, 0 and they seem even more limited when we attempt
to empathize with the selves we once were. Perhaps we feel our own per-
sonal commitments more threatened in the one case than in the other; we
easily accept the fact that some people lead lives directed toward goals
different from our own, but we often find it difficult to acknowledge that
we ourselves once had significantly different values. Whatever the reason,
a dramatic change in goals weakens our ability to review sympathetically
our past decisions within a now altered or abandoned framework of ends;
the more radical the change, the more difficult such sympathy will be.
60. It is particularly difficult for an individual to empathize with "people who belong to class,
racial and sexual groups different from his own." Kennedy, supra note 14, at 647.
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When a person cannot overcome the distance he feels from his own
earlier goals, when he cannot view them in the detached but empathetic
way a sociologist might, actions he once thought rational may no longer
appear so. From the standpoint of his present values, which he cannot
shake off or suspend, his past actions may seem pointless or evil; in this
case, he is likely to regard his earlier decisions as a foreign element whose
continuing influence appears senseless from the standpoint of his present
goals. This can be especially demoralizing.61 Although there are countless
ways in which a person's aspirations can be defeated by the senselessness
of the world, if he himself is somehow responsible for the defeat, he may
feel not only that he has been overborne by reality, but that he has, in
Aristotle's words, failed to be a friend to himself.62 Self-betrayal of this
sort weakens a person's confidence in his ability to make lasting commit-
ments and guard the things he cares for,6 and this, in turn, strikes at his
self-respect. When a person's goals change, his past decisions can have
this effect because these decisions remain his own, even though the norma-
tive standpoint from which they once seemed rational has become inacces-
sible. However strongly he now regards some earlier decision as a foreign
element, lodged in his life and exerting an irrational influence over it, a
person can never entirely disown the decision (without a considerable
amount of bad faith) as an arbitrary piece of fate, like cancer at an early
age.e
4
61. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 440 (1971) ("plagued by failure and self-doubt," we
cannot "continue in our endeavors").
62. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS *1166b 25-30.
63. See Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, in SYNTHtsE (forthcoming) (dis-
cussing moral significance of having specific cares and acting on them).
64. The distinction between disappointment and regret is not one that economists emphasize or
perhaps are even capable of recognizing. From an economic point of view, regret and disappointment
amount to the same thing. When an individual commits himself to do something, he makes a number
of assumptions about the likelihood of various contingencies; some of these assumptions are related to
his own subjective states (the likelihood that he will be alive when the time for performance comes,
that he will have the same interests and desires). In a strictly economic sense, these assumptions are
no different from those an individual makes about the likelihood of various objective states of affairs
(that the cow he is selling is sterile, that the King's coronation will be held as scheduled). Assumptions
of both sorts may be correct or incorrect, and an error of either kind can reduce the expected value of
a contract for one or both parties. Economically, there is no distinction between having been wrong
about the world and having been wrong about oneself.
Because a rational person wishes to avoid being wrong in either respect, before he makes a contract
he will take into account the fact that his own interests and desires may change in a way that will
render the contract worthless. He will assign a probability to this event, just as he assigns a
probability to the occurrence of various objective contingencies. Consequently, an economist might
argue that, even if a person's desires and interests change, he has no basis for doubting the rationality
of his original decision as long as he did his best to ascertain the likelihood of such a change.
If this view were correct, the distinction I have drawn between regret and disappointment would
collapse. But the economist's view of the matter leaves out an important fact. When a person considers
the consequences of a possible change in his goals, he necessarily does so from the standpoint of the
goals he then has; the significance he assigns to a change of this sort is determined by his present
interests and desires. If an important change does occur, there is nothing to guarantee that his prior
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Normally, when a person makes a contract he later comes to regret, he
is free to abandon the agreement and simply compensate the other party
for his loss. The damages the promisor must pay represent the cost of his
own decision, and the obligation to pay them is a continuing reminder of
former goals he has since modified or abandoned. A reminder of this sort
may intensify the promisor's regret and make it more difficult for him to
forget what now seems like an irrational decision, but this cannot be
avoided entirely as long as we adhere to the basic rule that a contracting
party must pay for the losses caused by his own unexcused breach.
If, however, the promisor is required to perform as he had originally
agreed-if he is barred from substituting damages for the specific per-
formance of his oblfgations-his feelings of regret are likely to be intensi-
fied, particularly when performance entails some ongoing personal cooper-
ation with the other party or subjection to his personal supervision. If the
breaching promisor must continue to work or live with the other party
and abide by the terms of a cooperative arrangement he now regrets, he
will almost certainly find it more difficult to distance himself from his
original values. He is likely, as a result, to feel more directly tied to the
goals he has repudiated and to be more painfully reminded of their con-
tinuing influence in his life. By substituting damages for performance, the
promisor gives his original commitment an abstract form less closely
linked to the specific goals that led him to make the commitment in the
first place; the edge of his regret is dulled and its disabling consequences
ameliorated. If he cannot distance himself from the contract by deperson-
alizing his relationship with the other party, the promisor's regret is likely
to be more intense and its effects more serious; the right to depersonalize a
contractual relationship is an aid to forgetfulness, which-within proper
limits-is a condition of moral health.
When the promisor's own values have changed dramatically, the com-
pulsory performance of a contract requiring his personal cooperation with
the other party may pose a special threat to his integrity or self-respect.
This is not the only situation, however, in which a moral danger of this
sort may exist. Suppose, for example, that an employee working for a
pharmaceutical concern discovers that his company is selling drugs used to
produce a lethal chemical weapon, a fact he did not know when he en-
tered the contract. If the employee believes that continuing to work for the
company is inconsistent with certain deeply-held moral convictions, the
violation of which would be a serious blow to his self-respect, he should
evaluation of its consequences will still seem rational. The alteration in his deliberative framework
that results from the change may preclude any empathic identification with his earlier point of view.
Economic theory ignores the important fact that some changes that upset a person's expectations are
not changes within a fixed framework of interests and desires, but are changes in the framework itself.
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be permitted to quit and pay his employer damages for whatever loss the
company suffers. Perhaps the employee will regard even the payment of
damages as a morally compromising act, but he may well consider his
continued employment a more personal and therefore more debasing con-
tribution to a program he thinks immoral. The law assures the employee's
right to choose between these alternatives by refusing to enforce any pro-
vision in his contract that purports to confer a right of specific enforce-
ment on the employer. We might, of course, protect the employee's moral
integrity by relieving him of any duty either to perform or pay damages,
but a remedy with such extreme consequences would lend itself to ex-
ploitation and tend to undermine the stability of contractual relations gen-
erally.6 5 To this extent, the bar against self-enslavement may be viewed as
a compromise that protects employees from the special debasement some-
times associated with specific performance of an obligation, but leaves
them exposed to the moral risks entailed by any contractual commitment
made on the basis of incomplete information about the world.
Some contracts, of course, are specifically enforceable, even though the
parties have not included a provision to this effect. Contracts for the sale
of unique goods are the most notable example.6 This may seem puzzling,
however, for here, too, actual performance can be demoralizing in a way
that compensation is not. Suppose, for example, that a seller of machine
parts, unobtainable from any other source, discovers that his buyer intends
to use them for a purpose the seller considers immoral. If the machine
parts are unique, the seller may be ordered to perform despite his moral
misgivings and a strong, ethically based preference for monetary compen-
sation. To be sure, the seller can (in theory) buy his way out of the con-
tract if his financial resources are adequate, 7 but so can an employee who
has voluntarily enslaved himself; the power to buy one's way out of an
obligation is therefore insufficient to explain why specific performance is
granted in one case but not the other.
Part of the explanation for this difference in treatment is that contracts
of employment are more difficult to specifically enforce because they re-
quire greater cooperation by the defendant and therefore involve an ele-
ment of moral hazard that contracts for the sale of goods do not." There
is, however, another reason why courts are more willing to compel per-
65. A more limited form of protection would require the employer to disclose in advance those
aspects of the job he could reasonably expect to be morally controversial. Where no disclosure has
been made, the employee would be free to void the contract at his discretion.
66. Kronman, supra note 10, at 355-65.
67. Id. at 372-73.
68. 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 1423, at 783 ('The proper performance of the services to
the best of the defendant's ability is uncertain and difficult to gauge. And any attempt to overcome
these difficulties might involve too serious an infringement of personal liberty to be tolerable.").
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formance in the latter case. Long personal service under the direction of
another and the payment of money are in reality poles of a continuum;
one is the least, and the other the most impersonal way of meeting a con-
tractual obligation. The transfer of property falls somewhere in between.
Many sales contracts do not require any personal cooperation or even con-
tact between the parties and are therefore closer to the pole of maximum
impersonality represented by money damages. The more impersonal an
act, the less likely it is to threaten an actor's integrity or self-respect; tak-
ing this into account, the specific enforcement of contracts for the sale of
goods seems more defensible from a moral point of view than its tradi-
tional justification on grounds of administrative convenience might
suggest.
Finally, how is the bar against waiving one's right to a discharge in
bankruptcy to be explained? Since a waiver of this sort merely creates
a continuing obligation on the part of the pronisor to pay his pre-
bankruptcy debts, it might not seem to pose the same threat to his integ-
rity as other forms of self-enslavement, which require the performance of
more personal services. In fact, however, the idea of regret, as I have de-
fined it, does help explain the institution of bankruptcy and the inaliena-
bility of the debtor's right to a discharge.
Clearly, a large debt can be a source of regret even though its payment
does not require a continuing personal relationship between the parties. It
might therefore seem sensible to measure the magnitude of the debtor's
potential regret by the magnitude of the debt itself and to adopt a rule
relieving him of the duty to repay any debt greater than some fixed per-
centage of the total value of his estate.69 At first glance, a rule of this sort
seems absurd: If a debt could be avoided simply because it was equal in
amount to, say, twenty percent of the debtor's estate, large loans would
become unenforceable. But bankruptcy is a rule of just this sort: If the
debtor's obligations exceed his assets-that is, equal more than one hun-
dred percent of the value of his estate-he may petition himself into bank-
ruptcy and be relieved of all dischargeable claims against him.
The right to a discharge is usually justified in terms of the debtor's need
for a fresh start, unhampered by earlier debts.70 One reason for giving the
debtor a fresh start is to counteract the self-hatred he may feel, having
mortgaged his entire future in a series of past decisions he now regrets.
Whatever its macroeconomic function, 1 the bankruptcy discharge has a
69. Such a rule would be an adjunct to and not a substitute for the bar against other forms of self-
enslavement, which would apply regardless of the sums involved.
70. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
71. See Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 107,
111.
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moral purpose as well-to restore to the debtor some measure of confi-
dence in his capacity to arrange his future as he wishes, free from the
dead hand of the past. Without such confidence, the debtor may lose even
that minimum of self-respect that is a condition for his taking an interest
in himself and his own life. To this extent, the right to a discharge in
bankruptcy serves the same general goal as the right to depersonalize a
contractual relationship by substituting damages for performance, and the
inalienability of both can be explained on similar grounds. Bankruptcy
reveals our acceptance of the fact that beyond a certain point, the sheer
magnitude of a person's debt may be demoralizing. The rules of bank-
ruptcy thus supplement, in a needed way, the other prohibitions against
self-enslavement I have discussed.
III. Judgment and Moral Imagination
In addition to the two forms of paternalism I have described, it is possi-
ble to distinguish a third. The restrictions that compose this third group
include some that are paternalistic in the most literal sense; I have in
mind various limitations on the enforcement of promises made by children
and other incompetent persons. These restrictions all differ in one impor-
tant respect from those I have characterized as prohibitions against self-
enslavement. The latter bar certain agreements without qualification:
Under no circumstances will the law recognize the validity of a promise to
become the slave of another or to abstain from bringing a divorce action
against one's spouse. Agreements of this sort are prohibited because of
their content; it makes no difference whether they have been entered into
impulsively and without consideration of the consequences, or after care-
ful deliberation. By contrast, the class of restrictions I now wish to con-
sider-exemplified by the rule that a child's contracts will generally not
be enforced against him-seems primarily concerned with defects in the
promisor's reasoning process.
Restrictions belonging to this third class characteristically prohibit the
enforcement of agreements only for a time, often referred to as a "cooling-
off" period, after which the restraint is lifted. The imposition of a
mandatory cooling-off period insures that the promisor has an opportunity
to reflect on his commitment and to withdraw from the contract if he
wishes. A temporary suspension of the promisor's contractual powers
reduces the likelihood of an overly hasty decision and thus helps counter-
act what I have described as a defect in his reasoning process; its purpose
is to prevent the promisor from binding himself too quickly or while his
judgment is impaired. Unlike the prohibition against self-enslavement,
72. I am indebted to Jonathan Bennett for suggesting this similarity to me.
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however, the imposition of a cooling-off period does not by itself guaran-
tee (or forbid) any particular substantive result.
In reality, the contractual incapacity of children also creates a
mandatory cooling-off period of the sort I have just described. Since this
may not be obvious, it is appropriate to begin by recalling the precise
nature of the limitations that constrain children in their contractual deal-
ings. There are, of course, certain contracts that children cannot make
under any circumstances and that are enforceable neither by nor against
them. An employment contract that fails to meet the requirements of state
or federal statutes regulating child labor is one obvious example.7 3 In ad-
dition, children are *subject to a more general limitation on their contrac-
tual powers that applies even when the contract in question is wholly
unobjectionable. With the money he has saved from his allowance, a
twelve-year old can purchase and use an expensive airplane ticket, but if
he comes to regret the decision, he cannot recover his money from the
airline.7" Similarly, in many states, if a minor pays for an automobile
with cash, he must return the car and compensate the seller for deprecia-
tion and the value of its use in order to rescind the contract and recover
the money he has pald .7  By contrast, if a minor makes a contract to
purchase an automobile or airline ticket, but changes his mind before the
sale is completed, the law permits him to disaffirm the contract without
liability.78 This power of avoidance cannot be contracted away; so long as
he has not yet performed his end of the bargain, a child is free to re-
nounce his promise without cost, and there is no legally effective means by
which he can waive this privilege.
If, however, a child wishes to honor his contract, he may do so; the
other party (assuming he is an adult) will then be bound to meet his
obligations under the agreement. 7 This creates an asymmetry in their re-
lationship: The child may, at his discretion, enforce the contract, but the
other party cannot enforce it against him. In practical effect, the child has
an option to enforce the contract any time after its formation and before
its revocation. During this period-which may aptly be described as a
cooling-off period-the child has an opportunity to reconsider the wisdom
of his original decision (on his own or with the benefit of adult counsel,
73. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-23 (1983).
74. Vichnes v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 173 Misc. 631, 18 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Term
1940).
75. Sparandera v. Staten Island Garage, Inc., 117 Misc. 780, 193 N.Y.S. 392 (Munic. Ct. 1921);
Gaither v. Wallingford, 101 Or. 389, 200 P. 910 (1921).
76. The power of disaffirmance is described in 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, §§ 222-239. An
exception to this power arises in the case of "necessary" goods. Id. §§ 240-244.
77. See id. § 226.
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invited or uninvited) and to withdraw from the contract if he wishes. 8
Clearly, a cooling-off period of this sort affords only partial protection
against the dangers of a rash or ill-considered decision, and a child can, to
some extent, negate its benefits simply by making an exchange rather than
contracting to do so.7 9 But there can be little doubt that the rule barring
enforcement of a child's contracts (except at his option) works to protect
children from their own shortsightedness and lack of judgment.
Indeed, something like this would appear to be the intended purpose of
all legally required cooling-off periods. For example, the statutory rule
(found in many states) that a couple may not marry until a stated period
of time has passed after the issuance of their license 0 and that, once mar-
ried, they may not obtain a divorce decree before the end of a similar
cooling-off period," is usually justified on the ground that important deci-
sions should not be made in haste or under the influence of a powerful
and potentially distorting passion. Analogous reasons could be given to
justify the imposition of a cooling-off period in certain consumer transac-
tions, such as door-to-door sales, where the consumer's normal defenses
are likely to be relaxed and his judgment impaired. 2 Diverse as the situa-
tions are to which these cooling-off periods apply, the objective in each
case is the same: to encourage sound judgment and reduce the influence of
passion and whim on the contractual commitments a person makes.
What presuppositions lie behind the paternalistic protection children
receive in their contractual dealings with others, and why is it sometimes
thought permissible to treat adults in the same fashion (by giving them an
option to avoid, without cost, promises that would otherwise be enforce-
able)? Some have argued that the law gives children and other incompe-
tent persons-the drunk and insane-a right to avoid their contracts in
order to protect them from fraudulent manipulation by those whose judg-
ment is not similarly impaired." If this were their sole purpose, these
78. If a child reaches majority before completing performance of a contract, he may be required to
pay for any goods he has already received under the contract if he sells, uses, or retains them for an
unreasonable time. Id. § 239.
79. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 126 (1970). A child's ability to harm
himself through imprudent purchases is limited by the resources he happens to have at any given
moment, resources that usually take time to accumulate. The time required to save for a substantial
purchase itself functions as a kind of cooling-off period by providing an opportunity for reflection and
by increasing the likelihood of parental intervention. If a child were allowed to make binding con-
tracts, his spending power-and hence his capacity to harm himself by spending foolishly-would no
longer be constrained by the limits of his present wealth. And since a contract can be made in an
instant (unlike accumulation, which requires time), parents would have less control over the purchases
their children make.
80. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-27(a) (1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13-b (McKinney 1977).
81. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4514 (West 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-67(a) (1983).
82. See supra note 12.
83. Henry v. Root, 33 N.Y. 526, 536 (1865) (law aims to "protect infants or minors from their
own improvidence and folly, and to save them from the depredations and frauds practised upon them
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special restrictions might be justified on economic grounds as a supple-
ment to the general efficiency-enhancing prohibition against fraud. But
the rule that a child may avoid his contracts if he wishes is intended to do
more than protect him against adult exploitation. A child possesses this
power of avoidance even when there has been no fraud or overreaching,
and both courts and commentators agree it is appropriate he have such
power. 4 Whether or not he has been misled, a child may show poor judg-
ment in making a particular contract, and it is protection against his own
ignorance and immaturity-not merely the advantage-taking of
others-that the law affords. This view, though familiar and widely ac-
cepted, is difficult to justify on economic grounds alone. Why should the
general presumptioi that a person is the best judge of his own interests be
suspended in the case of children (as well as drunks, married persons con-
templating divorce, and purchasers of goods sold door-to-door)? To an-
swer this question, we must first give some account of the nature of judg-
ment itself, a subject neglected in the law and economics literature (and
elsewhere). 5
When we say that a child (or anyone else) lacks good judgment, we
most often mean that he lacks the capacity to evaluate critically his own
interests and desires. A child obviously has interests and desires; what he
lacks is skill in determining which of them should be encouraged rather
than suppressed, and in predicting how they are likely to influence his
own character (the kind of person he becomes and the sorts of things he
cares about). It is much easier to say what this skill is not than to state
precisely what it is. To begin with, good judgment must be distinguished
from simply having certain desires, however admirable or meritorious
they may be. Judgment, as I am using the term, involves a critical reflec-
tion on one's interests and desires and hence presupposes some distance
from them; indeed, we associate judgment with sobriety and dispas-
sion-with states of relative desirelessness-and think of judgment as re-
quiring disengagement from the immediacy of desire. This is why it is
misleading to characterize judgment as a desire of any sort, even a second-
order desire to cultivate or suppress other, more elementary ones (like the
desire to smoke or listen to Mozart)."6 Our second-order desires may
by the designing and unprincipled").
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981); 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 226.
But see Navin, The Contracts of Minors Viewed from the Perspective of Fair Exchange, 50 N.C.L.
REV. 517 (1972) (criticizing automatic voidability of minors' contracts).
85. One important exception is the work of Hannah Arendt. My own views regarding the nature
of judgment have been deeply influenced by her original and provocative remarks on the subject. See
H. ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1982); 2 H. ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE
MIND 255-72 (1978); H. ARENDT, The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Political Significance, in
BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 197, 219-26 (1968).
86. For a discussion of the moral significance of the distinction between first- and second-order
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themselves show poor judgment and merely by acting from such a desire,
a person does not demonstrate that he is capable of the dispassion judg-
ment requires.
Judgment must also be distinguished from the instrumental rationality
involved in the choice of means, or the comparison of different methods
for achieving a given goal. In deciding which goals to pursue, we normally
take instrumental considerations into account, but it is wrong to think that
a choice of ends can ever be made on the basis of such considerations
alone. Indeed, the opposite seems more true: The opportunity cost we at-
tribute to the pursuit of one goal is always a function of the value we
ascribe to other goals, and, hence, any conclusion we reach regarding the
instrumental rationality of a particular course of action will rest upon
noninstrumental assumptions about the intrinsic merit of the different
ends we might embrace. To deliberate about means we must first have
deliberated about ends, and only a person who shows skill in his choice of
ends can be said to possess judgment. If a person lacks this skill, even the
greatest talent for instrumental reasoning cannot make up the difference;
to such a person we ascribe shrewdness, but not good judgment.
Because judgment concerns the choice of ends rather than means, one
might think that it is not a form of deliberative rationality at all, but a
kind of intuitive insight. On this view, a person has good judgment if he
simply sees which course of action is best, even though he may not be able
to give an account of the reasons for his choice.8 7 But this view also seems
wrong. Judgment is skill in deliberation-it is the skill of deliberating
well-whereas intuition brings deliberation to an end and is something
altogether different from it. We tend to think of judgment as an art and
speak of someone exercising careful judgment; but intuition is not an art,
and the term "careful intuition" is a contradiction in terms.
Good judgment, then, is not simply intuitive insight, nor is it a form of
instrumental rationality, and it cannot be equated with the possession of
certain desires (even desires of a higher order that have other desires as
their object). Can anything positive be said about judgment and the role it
plays in our practical deliberations? Judgment is, I believe, best thought
of as the faculty of moral imagination, 8 the capacity to form an imagina-
tive conception of the moral consequences of a proposed course of action
and to anticipate its effect on one's character. A person has good judgment
if this faculty is developed and strong, poor judgment if it is not. The
concept of moral imagination is vague, and I shall attempt to explain
desires, see Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971).
87. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 62, *1142a 20-30 (prudence has as its object "the ultimate partic-
ular fact, of which there is perception but no scientific knowledge").
88. See 2 H. ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND 257-61 (1978).
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more clearly what I mean by it.
When a person is considering a particular course of action, he may ask
a variety of questions regarding its moral acceptability. Is it permitted (is
the action consistent with his moral and legal obligations)? Does the ac-
tion conform with his personal ideals? What effect is it likely to have on
his character (will the action change him and if so, in a direction he ap-
proves)? To answer these questions, he must construct a mental image of
the action and, then, with this image as an aid, attempt to determine the
moral effects the action is likely to have."9
The construction of such an image is a synthetic operation. 90 Even sim-
ple actions can rarely be evaluated merely by adding the (positive or nega-
tive) value of their components. The process in question may more aptly
be compared to the construction of a work of art. To be successful, an
artist must gather the elements of his work into a meaningful unity that
strengthens the internal relations among them. Similarly, a person at-
tempting to anticipate the moral significance of an action must construct a
mental picture that brings out the contextual importance of each element
and clarifies the transforming, as distinct from merely additive, effects the
action may have on his character as a whole.'
Judgment, then, is a form of imagination; it is the creative ability to
anticipate, in thought, the moral effects of an action viewed in the context
of a person's character and aspirations. This raises a difficulty, however.
We associate judgment with objectivity, but, because imagination involves
an important element of creativity, we tend to regard it as a personal or
subjective quality; indeed, when we are told that a person has a vivid
imagination, we are likely to assume that he is out of touch with reality,
with the world as it is objectively constituted. Children, for example, are
often said to have powerful imaginations, which they lose by degree as
they are introduced to the objective world of adulthood. It would be a
89. I use the term "moral" in a broad sense to include everything that bears directly on one or
another of the questions enumerated above.
90. See I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON *139-42, B178-81.
91. Philosophers have noted the similarity between moral and aesthetic creativity. Berkeley, for
instance, argues that the moral quality of the world is improved by the evil it contains, much as a
single spot of color can improve the overall impression a painting makes. G. BERKELEY, THE PRINCI-
PLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE §§ 152-156, in 2 OF THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY, BISHOP OF
CHAYNE 111-13 (A. Luce & T. Jessop eds. 1949). If the moral significance of events were merely
additive, the positive or negative value of each being contained wholly in itself, the world would
necessarily be a better place without any evil at all; for evil to represent an improvement from the
moral point of view, the ethical meaning of the world must have the same kind of synthetic unity that
a painting or novel does; it must, in short, be more than the sum of its parts. Whatever its merits, this
familiar argument for the goodness of God's creation highlights the fact that moral reflection and
artistic production have something important in common. To be skilled at either, a person must ap-
preciate the reciprocal influence the elements of an action or an artwork have on one another and
anticipate the effects of their combination; if he possesses this ability, we say, in either case, that he
has imagination.
The Yale Law Journal
mistake, however, to conclude that imagination and objectivity are anti-
thetical. In the domain of moral reasoning, these capacities are intimately
connected. Both require a disengagement from the immediacy of desire;
this common element links them to one another and to the notion of moral
judgment as well.
The identification of objectivity with neutrality or impartiality is famil-
iar enough, especially in the case of interpersonal conflicts. To resolve
such conflicts in an objective fashion, one must adopt a point of view
"above" the conflicting interests of the persons involved, the point of view
of an arbiter who considers the interests of all parties from the same inde-
pendent perspective. What is perhaps less obvious is that objectivity in
interpersonal conflicts requires a detachment from the immediacy of one's
own desires. A person striving to be objective must deny his desires the
influence they ordinarily have (much in the way that a judge must put his
own feelings and biases out of play when deciding a case). Disinterested-
ness and neutrality would be impossible if we could not disengage our-
selves, for however brief a period, from our own desires. The power to do
so must therefore be regarded as an indispensable condition of our capac-
ity to attain even a small measure of objectivity in our relations with other
persons.
The same is true in our intrapersonal moral deliberations. When I am
considering a course of action of any real significance-one likely to have
some bearing on the achievement of my most important goals or on the
development of my character-it is essential that I disengage myself, so
far as I am able, from the particular desires that motivate me and make
the decision to take the action or avoid it in a considered, dispassionate
way. I must attempt, in other words, to choose between this action and its
alternatives in a neutral fashion and to resolve the intrapersonal dilemma
they present in the same way (though not according to the same princi-
ples) that I resolve my differences with other persons when our interests
conflict.
Imagination also requires disengagement from the immediacy of desire.
Consider, first, the interpersonal use of imagination. An anthropologist or
sociologist who wishes to understand the meaning of some previously un-
explained practice-the ritual behavior, let us say, of a primitive tribe
culturally remote from his own society-must make an effort to enter im-
aginatively into the tribe's own world and to see it from "within." This
does not mean, of course, that he must actually embrace the tribe's values
or view of the world (in the sense of approving or endorsing them). He
must instead imaginatively construct a picture that connects the practice
he wishes to explain with other aspects of the tribe's life, thereby locating
this particular activity in a wider context of purposeful actions whose
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meaning is already understood. To do this with any success, however, an
anthropologist or sociologist must temporarily suspend his own cultural
beliefs and deny them the efficacy or influence they normally have in his
nonscientific life.92 To the extent he is unable to disengage or neutralize
his own cultural commitments, his powers of imaginative construction are
likely to be impoverished. Certain explanations of the tribe's behavior may
not occur to him at all, including the explanation that most accurately
reflects the tribe's own internal point of view. The more remote the sub-
ject matter of his inquiry from his own experience, the more the scientist
needs an imagination whose free exercise requires the temporary suspen-
sion of personal commitments.
Imagination plays a similar role in our intrapersonal deliberations.
When a person is considering whether to pursue an important course of
action, he is likely to construct different imaginative pictures of it, each of
which is a representation of its possible significance for him. The range of
alternative interpretations a person is able to place on his own future con-
duct, his power of imaginative variation, is increased to the extent he is
able to suspend the desires that presently motivate him to act. If a person
cannot suspend his desires, even temporarily, they are likely to impede
what Kant called the "free play of the imagination." '98 A powerful desire
can stimulate the imagination, but may also constrain it. This is true in
interpersonal relations, where our desires sometimes prevent us from un-
derstanding the experience of other persons by blocking our ability to
enter their world imaginatively. Equally, when we reflect on ourselves, on
who we are and what we wish to become, the pressing immediacy of our
desires can paralyze our ability to anticipate, in imagination, the moral
consequences of our own actions. In both cases, a free imagination is pos-
sible only if we have first given it the space it requires by distancing our-
selves from our own desires.
It is this requirement that imagination and objectivity have in common.
A person whose imagination is weak or undeveloped because he cannot
extricate himself from the immediacy of his own desires will find it diffi-
cult to be impartial, and, to the extent his imagination is strengthened, an
important condition of moral objectivity will also be secured. There is
therefore nothing paradoxical about the claim that judgment (which we
associate with impartiality and objectivity) represents a form of imagina-
tion. The exercise of judgment, whether in relations with others or in the
elaboration and pursuit of personal ideals, requires a kind of disinterest-
edness, and the person who cannot suspend his own desires will never be
92. See A. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 14-16 (1983); M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 10-15 (1949).
93. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT § 9 (J. Bernard trans. 1951).
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respected for his good judgment.94
There is also an important connection between imagination and regret.
A person is most likely to regret a past decision when he can no longer
appreciate its rationality, when it seems to him to have been irrational
and not merely mistaken. The weaker a person's imagination, the less
likely he is even to consider the possibility that the desires motivating him
to act may one day seem antithetical to his deepest interests, making it
difficult for him to understand why he acted as he did and impossible to
forgive himself for doing so; a person with a weak imagination is therefore
especially susceptible to regret and its corrosive effects. This is another
reason why the development of moral imagination, the faculty of judg-
ment, is rightly included among the conditions of a free life and helps
explain the fact that we associate poor judgment and a special susceptibil-
ity to regret with a lack of freedom, as we do in the case of children.
This suggests a general justification for those rules of contract law that
protect against poor judgment by imposing a mandatory cooling-off period
during which the parties to an agreement can withdraw after their initial
enthusiasm has subsided. If judgment is a condition of freedom, restric-
tions of this sort arguably increase the parties' freedom by forcibly encour-
aging the development of their imaginative capacities; at the very least,
they promote the welfare of the parties without significantly diminishing
their freedom. This argument, however, is overbroad: The ways in which
a person's judgment may be impaired are protean, but we quite properly
refuse to recognize lack of judgment as a general defense against the claim
that one has failed to meet his contractual obligations. What explains the
law's selectivity in this regard and the particular pattern of restrictions it
enforces?
The exceptional character of these restrictions reflects their anti-
democratic nature. Our society is committed to the principle that, as long
as they do not violate the rights of others, individuals may pursue their
94. The close connection between objectivity and imagination is reflected in the moral education
we give our children. We often say to children, "Imagine how it would feel if. . .," and encourage
them to consider their action from points of view other than their own. By stimulating their imagina-
tion in this way, we help them develop a habit of disinterestedness, which is an essential condition of
objectivity in moral life. See J. RAWLS, supra note 61, at 468-69. To acquire such a habit, however,
children must learn to put some distance between themselves and their desires. Initially, they are
encouraged to do this in their relations with others and later, in their introspective relation to them-
selves. If a person cannot detach himself from his own desires, he will be unable to assess them
critically, and one who lacks this quality of critical reflectiveness may also be said to lack self-control
and even autonomy: Instead of being the master of his desires, allowing or denying their satisfaction
in accordance with a rational plan, he will be mastered by them. To this extent, lack of moral imagi-
nation threatens freedom, and we train children to be imaginative so that they may eventually be free.
To say that children lack judgment, that they have difficulty being objective, that their imagination is
restricted, and that their decisions are not those of a fully free person, are different ways of describing
the condition of a rational being enthralled by desire.
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own conceptions of the good. We are also committed to the idea that the
legal order should remain neutral among these conceptions, not favoring
some or disfavoring others on the grounds of their intrinsic merit.
95
Whenever the law invalidates a class of agreements for reasons of this
sort, it runs counter to the liberal ideal of a legal order that does not
discriminate among conceptions of the good.96 Although in certain cases
such discrimination may be justifiable, our commitment to democratic val-
ues prompts us to demand a special defense for any proposed discrimina-
tory rule. The burden of proof, in all cases of this kind, lies with those
who would invalidate a particular class of agreements on the ground that
they contribute to, or are part of, a way of life considered offensive or
degrading.
Mandatory cooling-off periods, which only postpone the moment of
contractual commitment, do not conflict as sharply with the principle of
liberal neutrality as do those restrictions that flatly bar the enforcement of
certain agreements because of their substance or content. But even the
requirement of a cooling-off period has antidemocratic implications, which
explains why we demand a special justification for these restrictions and
would never think of imposing a cooling-off period in every contractual
relationship. A certain degree of impetuous commitment may be part of a
person's conception of what makes life valuable or 'at least interesting; to
the extent the law prevents him from making such commitments, it ob-
structs his pursuit of a legitimate personal ideal. More importantly, the
imposition of a mandatory cooling-off period implies a moral deficiency in
those to whom it applies. While this need not be viewed as a direct chal-
lenge to the intrinsic merit of any particular conception of the good, the
assertion of such a deficiency is prima facie inconsistent with the principle
of equal respect for persons from which our commitment to liberal neu-
trality ultimately derives.
In the case of children, the imposition of a mandatory cooling-off period
seems perfectly acceptable. Indeed, the special restrictions to which chil-
dren are subject in their contractual dealings do not even strike us as
anomalies. Anyone who claims that the principle of equal respect for per-
sons requires that we defer to the choices of children as we do to those of
adults has lost sight of an important fact: However great their eventual
powers of autonomous self-control, persons have a natural history in
which they undergo moral and psychological development along predict-
95. See Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 127-36 (S. Hampshire ed.
1978).
96. The nonrecognition of homosexual marriages is an example of what I have in mind. See
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 874-78 (1979); Note, Homosexuals' Right to Mary: A Constitutional Test
and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979).
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able lines and normally acquire the various capacities-including judg-
ment or moral imagination-without which freedom in any meaningful
sense is impossible. There is nothing remarkable in these observations, but
they do reflect widespread agreement about certain basic facts of human
character and development that tend to be obscured by the abstract con-
ception of the person underlying our modern law of contracts and the
various philosophical theories devised to explain it.
When both parties are competent adults, the imposition of a mandatory
cooling-off period is, of course, more problematic. Consider, for example,
the waiting period required in most states before a couple may begin or
terminate a marriage.97 Requirements of this sort have traditionally been
justified on the grounds that a person who decides to marry or divorce
without delay is likely to be moved by a powerful passion that can cloud
his judgment and cause him to act in a way he will later regret.98 The law
protects such persons against their own temporary lack of judgment by
requiring them to pause before they can proceed. Although poor judgment
is certainly not limited to those entering or dissolving a marriage, two
different considerations justify the unusual requirement of a cooling-off
period in these circumstances. First, those contemplating marrriage or di-
vorce are especially likely to be influenced by strong and potentially dis-
torting passions-by erotic attraction, anger, or jealousy. Like powerful
passions of any sort, those that attend a marriage or divorce inhibit the
imagination, making it more difficult for those involved to achieve a mea-
sure of neutrality. To be sure, similarly distorting passions may be at
work even in the most mundane commercial transactions, but there is no
way of distinguishing these cases from those in which the parties' judg-
ment is unclouded without an intrusive and probably futile inquiry into
their feelings and motives.
Second, although speed is essential in many contractual relationships,
especially those of a commercial nature, this is less often and less obvi-
ously the case in the formation or dissolution of a marriage. A business-
man may need an immediate and binding commitment from the person
with whom he deals in order to plan for the future, but a similar urgency,
created by competitive opportunities, rarely attends the decision to marry
or divorce. If every contract were subject to a mandatory cooling-off pe-
riod, the whole system of market exchange on which our modern economy
rests would be impaired, but the requirement that a couple wait before
they marry or divorce has less serious consequences.
These last remarks are tentative and leave much to be explained; they
97. See supra p. 788.
98. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1262 (1958).
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do not, for example, explain why a cooling-off period is also required in
various consumer transactions9 or provide a basis for evaluating the wis-
dom of such requirements. My aim, however, has not been to justify every
paternalistic rule intended to protect promisors against the consequences
of their own poor judgment (many of these may, on reflection, prove un-
justifiable) but to introduce, or rather reintroduce, the concept of judgment
into our thinking about contract law.
Contract law is centrally concerned with voluntary exchange, and, al-
though exchange is by no means limited to the market, our law of con-
tracts tends to treat the impersonal market transaction as the paradigm of
all exchange relationships. 100 The law of contracts does not encourage or
even permit, except in extreme cases, an inquiry into the promisor's mo-
tives, emotions, and personal circumstances. When the promisor is treated
in this way, as a disembodied ego or will without personal qualities, 101 it
is easy to forget that even the most impersonal market transaction occurs
between human beings with a natural history, and to underestimate the
importance, for freedom itself, of the capacities people normally acquire as
they mature. The will-based theories of obligation that dominate the intel-
lectual scene today obscure the complexity of our law of contracts by put-
ting before us a wholly denatured conception of the person in which pas-
sion and moral imagination have no place. Whatever in our law of
contracts is centrally concerned with these matters has, as a result, become
mysterious and been brought under suspicion from a moral point of view.
The rediscovery of judgment as a topic of interest and importance would
be a step in the other direction.
Conclusion
Our legal system restricts contractual freedom in many ways and for
many reasons. Some of these restrictions are paternalistic: Their purpose
is to prevent people from harming themselves through their own ill-con-
sidered or disadvantageous promises. The paternalistic rules in our law of
contracts do not derive, however, from a single principle, nor is there any
one idea that best explains them all. In this Article, I have described three
different forms of paternalism and have attempted to clarify the philo-
99. See supra note 12.
100. The impersonality of the market is reflected in many of the most basic features of contract
law: the traditional unwillingness of courts to upset bargains for inadequacy of consideration, P.
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 448-51 (1979), the preference for money
damages over specific performance, see Kronman, supra note 10, at 369-76, the noncompensability of
emotional harms, 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 1341, and the refusal to recognize financial hard-
ship as a form of duress, Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569, 8 N.W. 511 (1881).
101. See C. FRIED, supra note 59, at 2, 68-69; O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 300 (1881);
R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 65-68.
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sophical presuppositions that underlie each. I have argued that only the
first, the nondisclaimable warranty, can be defended persuasively in eco-
nomic terms. All three may be justified on moral grounds; in each case,
however, the justification turns upon a different principle or ideal: distrib-
utive fairness, self-respect, and the value of judgment or moral imagina-
tion. The concept of paternalism conceals too much philosophical variety
to be useful by itself; it wrongly suggests that all paternalistic restrictions
address a single problem and must be justified by a single principle, or not
at all.
Of course, the moral principles that underlie the three forms of pater-
nalism distinguished in this Article are not entirely unconnected. I have
emphasized, in particular, the close connection between moral imagination
and regret; a complete theory of the person might further illuminate the
link between them. It may also be possible to establish a connection be-
tween these ideas (which belong to the domain of philosophical psychol-
ogy) and the concept of distributive justice by arguing, as Rawls does,102
that self-respect is a social good whose distribution is subject to the moral
requirements applicable to all such goods. If these links can one day be
established with as much conviction as philosophy permits, then perhaps
we shall conclude that the concept of paternalism has an underlying unity
after all. But it will be a different unity, and a deeper one, than any the
concept now possesses.
102. J. RAWLS, supra note 61, at 440, 534.
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